Central and Eastern Europe is bracing for two pivotal elections over the next 18 months – a Czech general election due on October 3-4, 2025, and a Hungarian parliamentary vote by April 2026. These contests will test the region’s political currents and could reshape both countries’ trajectories. In Czechia, a populist opposition party ANO, led by billionaire Andrej Babiš, is poised to win the most votes but may struggle to form a government. In Hungary, long-ruling Prime Minister Viktor Orbán faces an unprecedented challenge from a new centrist party amid economic strains. For business, this means a period of heightened uncertainty: policy direction, regulatory stability, and relations with the EU could all hinge on how these elections play out. These elections also unfold against a shifting regional backdrop:
- Slovakia saw Robert Fico’s populist return in 2023, underscoring how nationalist figures can rebound quickly.
- Poland swung the other way: liberal Donald Tusk took office in 2023, but in June 2025 Karol Nawrocki (backed by PiS) narrowly won the presidency, creating institutional friction. Tusk responded with a July 2025 reshuffle — new economy and energy portfolios, stronger roles for trusted allies — but polls suggest little boost in support. Poland is now in a two-headed dynamic: a pro-EU government, but a conservative president with veto powers.
- These mixed signals remind investors that Central Europe is not moving in one direction, but rather oscillating between populist and liberal impulses — with EU institutions acting as the anchor.
Czechia: Clear lead, fragile governing options
Opposition movement ANO heads into October with a polling lead of around 28%, compared with ~21% for Prime Minister Petr Fiala’s SPOLU coalition. SPD and STAN polls in the low teens, with the Pirates, and several new entrants hovering near the 5% threshold. ANO will almost certainly win the most votes — but not a majority. Mainstream parties (SPOLU, STAN, Pirates) have ruled out coalitions with ANO or extremists. ANO’s path runs through SPD and smaller anti-establishment players, but President Petr Pavel has drawn red lines: he might not appoint ministers advocating exit from NATO or the EU. The president’s hesitation to appoint Babiš amid the ongoing conflict-of-interest investigation could further heighten political uncertainty. That constraint limits coalition space and raises the odds of drawn-out negotiations.
Two risks stand out:
- Fragmentation — as many as seven parties may clear the threshold, complicating seat math.
- Turnout volatility — undecided voter base remain sizeable, and new postal voting rules for citizens abroad could swing margins.
For business: whichever side governs, expect noise, slower decision-making, and patchy consensus. A Babiš-led government could sharpen Brussels friction (for example, providing national support for the Patriots’ campaign against the new EU-Mercosur trade deal); a fragile liberal coalition would inch forward but lack decisive clout.
Hungary: Orbán faces an unfamiliar threat in 2026
For the first time in over a decade, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán faces a consolidated challenger: Péter Magyar’s Tisza party. A Medián poll (August 2025) put Tisza at 51% vs. Fidesz at 36% among decided voters; other surveys show smaller but consistent Tisza leads. Two caveats are essential: Hungary’s parliamentary election is expected in April 2026 (formal date not yet announced, but April is the earliest and most likely), and in the 2022 race, polls also suggested a close contest before Fidesz won comfortably. Today’s numbers show momentum — not certainty.
Orbán retains structural advantages: a media ecosystem tilted toward Fidesz, electoral districting rules, and the ability to deploy late-cycle wedge issues. A delayed sovereignty/foreign-funding bill targeting organizations that might influence the Hungarian public sphere but receive funding from abroad could resurface before the vote, reinforcing campaign themes. Even with headwinds, Fidesz has tools to narrow the gap.
The macro context is mixed. The government adopted an early 2026 budget with optimistic growth and pre-election tax relief to repair household sentiment. If the economy underperforms, fiscal tightening will be unavoidable post-election. Meanwhile, EU funds remain frozen over rule-of-law disputes, stalling public investment. A Tisza government would seek to unlock these quickly; a sixth Orbán term would prolong EU frictions. If Orbán remains in power, he will continue acting as a powerful actor as EU Council member promoting lesser EU integration and behave actively against the mainstream parties through his new parliamentary group ('Patriots for Europe' - where ANO is a member just like Fidesz). Tisza already joined the EPP so if they win, there would be more leaning to mainstream policies.
For business: Hungary’s race is the most competitive since 2010, but incumbency still counts. Companies should scenario-plan for both continuity — with persistent EU tensions — and change, which would bring a transition period and pressure for quick domestic wins.
Beyond who wins, the real constraint for companies in Central Europe is time lost to politics:
- Czechia: Coalition negotiations after October could drag well into late 2025. Even once a government is in place, fragile arithmetic will mean slow policymaking.
- Hungary: From late 2025 until the April 2026 election, politics will be in campaign mode. Expect tactical giveaways, not reforms. Policy clarity won’t emerge until after the election — and could be further delayed if a change of government requires transition time.
For business, this means delays to legislation, approvals, and EU-fund disbursements are more predictable than any single electoral outcome.
How to navigate the landscape
- Plan for slower timelines: Coalition arithmetic in Czechia and pre-election tactics in Hungary mean policy moves will lag well into 2026.
- Engage across camps: Build relationships broadly — with parties, presidents, regulators, and civil-service actors who act as guardrails. Keep engagement strictly non-partisan.
- Stress-test EU assumptions: In Czechia, a nationalist-tinged government could wobble on EU climate and fiscal files. In Hungary, the EU funds dispute is a live variable regardless of who governs.
- Keep asks pragmatic: Both systems are heading into negotiation-heavy cycles. Focus on proposals that are low-cost, administratively feasible, and visibly beneficial.
Conclusion
Czechia and Hungary are both heading into elections that will amplify uncertainty. In Prague, coalition bargaining is likely to slow decision-making; in Budapest, polls suggest real competition but the system still favors the incumbent. For businesses, the common challenge is: slower policymaking, noisier politics, and unpredictable timelines on EU funding and fiscal measures. The best approach is to plan for delays, scenario-test for both continuity and change, and engage across the political spectrum without betting on one outcome.
