Venezuela's Transition: Maduro's Capture, Legal Framework, and the Race for Strategic Resources.

 The military operation of the United States that led to the arrest of Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026, has changed Venezuela’s political and commercial profile. Unquestionably there is and will be, a transitional vacuum—a rapid dismantling of the centralized patronage network, a contest for control of resource-rich territories in the southern part of the country, and a re-engagement of Western multilateral agencies and private enterprises.

All complicated by a new leader with old alliances, who faces an almost impossible task in doing the bidding of her new overlord whilst containing the radical elements of the previous ruling elite. This is without considering the likely forthcoming groundswell of a long subjugated remaining and returning population who likely do like, whatever President Trump states, the opposition in its various guises. In short, a febrile situation. 

The transitional government, which the U.S. has recognized, will likely prioritize reforming the energy and mining industries to shore up fiscal accounts. This is a move away from political speculation to technical execution: traversing a risky and volatile security climate in pursuit of worldclass reserves. The country boasts the largest proven crude oil reserves of 303 billion barrels in the world, the seventh-largest natural gas reserves worldwide, and critical minerals such as gold, coltan, bauxite and rare earth elements. The issue is no longer whether those resources would be developed, but under what conditions, with what institutions, and with which investors.

Operation Absolute Resolve and its Aftermath

In the immediate aftermath of Operation Absolute Resolve, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez proclaimed herself the interim president, invoking Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution regarding the "absolute absence" of the president. Her rise to power was rapidly approved by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) and, even more significantly, by Minister of Defense Vladimir Padrino López, who broadcast on state television from behind the military high command to promise loyalty to the constitution and the new interim government. Diosdado Cabello, the Interior Minister, also publicly acknowledged Rodríguez's authority, and he keeps control over the police and intelligence apparatus (SEBIN).

President Trump has announced a policy of direct U.S. oversight rather than installing the opposition leadership. In a press conference on January 3, Trump stated: "We are going to run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper and judicious transition." Trump dismissed opposition leader and Nobel laureate María Corina Machado as lacking "the support or respect" to govern, effectively sidelining the democratic opposition in favor of a U.S.-directed administration. Trump warned that Vice President Rodríguez faces consequences if she does not comply with U.S. directives. U.S. Secretary of State Rubio and Defense Secretary Hegseth have been designated to oversee this transition. The stated U.S. priority is not immediate elections, but rather securing control over energy assets, with officials citing "reimbursement" for damages as a justification.

The international response was swift and polarized. The governments of Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil issued strong condemnations, calling the operation a violation of sovereignty, and calling for Maduro to be released immediately. The United Kingdom and Canada welcomed the prospect of democratic renewal but stated that their emphasis was on respecting international law. The EU echoed “restraint,” balancing its criticism of Maduro with concern over the precedent. UN Secretary-General Guterres said the operation has created a “dangerous precedent” that contravenes international law. Colombian President Petro condemned it as a violation of sovereignty and deployed border forces.

The Business Response

The reaction in the market to Maduro's capture has been swift and striking. Chevron shares soared 7.82% in premarket trading on January 3, with Halliburton up 8.45%, ConocoPhillips up 7.54%, and ExxonMobil up 3.95%. And the catalyst is obvious: Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly stated that he is “pretty certain” that “there will be dramatic interest from Western companies” in Venezuela’s oil infrastructure, noting that U.S. refineries along the Gulf Coast stand uniquely positioned to deal with Venezuela’s heavy crude, a commodity in a global shortage.

Between the market openings of January 2 and January 7, 2026, the selected major energy stocks on the NYSE exhibited a predominantly bullish trend. Halliburton (HAL) significantly outperformed the group, surging 9,70% to reach an opening price of $31,09. ConocoPhillips (COP) opened today at $97,25 and Chevron (CVX) with an opening price of $157,36, also posted robust gains of 3,89% and 3,42%, respectively. Conversely, Exxon Mobil (XOM) diverged slightly from the sector’s positive momentum, recording a marginal decline of 0,18% to open at $119,87.  

But the real window into post-Maduro opportunity emerged with news that a group of approximately 20 U.S. investors, representing hedge funds, asset managers, and energy firms, is planning a delegation to Caracas in March 2026. Foreign investors are recognizing between USD 500 billion and USD 750 billion in potential investment opportunities over the next five years, Charles Myers, chairman of Signum Global Advisors and former vice-chairman of Evercore explains, the “centerpiece” of which are foreign investments in oil and gas. Myers, who has organized investor trips before to Syria and Ukraine, characterized the mood as one of “cautious optimism,” because the U.S. is the one directly overseeing the transition.

Oil & Gas: The Numbers

On January 6th Caracas and Washington agreed for Venezuela to export up to about $2 billion worth of crude oil to the United States. The deal would redirect oil supplies that were previously heading to China and help Venezuela avoid deeper cuts in production. It also signals Caracas may be responding to U.S. demands — including opening its oil industry to U.S. companies such as Chevron — or risk further U.S. pressure.

The current operators in Venezuela are Chevron (which is responsible for just shy of 27 percent of current production, at approximately 242,000 barrels per day), Eni, Repsol, and Maurel & Prom. Production overall hovers at 900,000 barrels per day (a decrease of 70% compared to pre-sanctions levels). Francisco Monaldi, director of Latin American Energy Policy at Rice University’s Baker Institute, calculates a full revival of the oil sector could cost upwards of USD 100 billion across the board and take several years. But there are near-term gains. Ali Moshiri, a former executive at Chevron, predicts that Chevron and smaller operators could boost production to 1 million barrels per day in 18 months for a USD 7 billion investment. Rapidan Energy estimates a lower, mid-term increase of 200,000 barrels per day in Year 1 (one year after the transition).

Offshore gas projects represent faster entry points. The Perla Field (operated by Repsol and Eni) currently produces 550 million cubic feet of natural gas per day, with a potential capacity of 1.2 billion cubic feet per day. The Cardon IV field (jointly operated by Eni and Repsol) currently produces 500 million cubic feet per day but is sold entirely to the domestic market; this could be expanded to 1.2 billion cubic feet per day through the Trans-Caribbean pipeline connecting to Colombia. Shell is accelerating development of the Dragon Field, targeting first gas production in 2026 (moved up from 2027) with phased capacity ultimately reaching 350 million cubic feet per day, with gas exported to Atlantic LNG facilities in Trinidad. These offshore projects will be critical to supply European and regional liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets. 

Critical Minerals: The Strategic Pivot

While oil provides cash flow, critical minerals are a strategic priority. The Guayana Shield and Orinoco Mining Arc (covering 111,843 square kilometers, or roughly 12% of Venezuelan territory) contain Latin America's largest gold reserves (approximately 7,000 to 10,000 metric tons), significant coltan (niobium-tantalum) deposits, thorium-bearing rare earth elements, and estimated 340 million tonnes of nickel. A U.S. State Department report submitted to Congress in September 2024 cited a 2021 OECD analysis estimating that gold extraction from the Orinoco Mining Arc averaged approximately USD 2.2 billion annually over the previous five years. However, more recent 2024 analysis by the Financial Accountability and Corporate Transparency (FACT) Coalitionsuggests the true figure is substantially higher, with approximately 70% of gold production (valued at more than USD 4.4 billion in 2021) being smuggled and laundered internationally.

The sector has historically been controlled by irregular mining groups, locally known as "sindicatos," as well as FARC dissidents, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and Tren de Aragua.  

These groups determine who operates mines, levy taxes on extraction, and facilitate smuggling through Brazil, Colombia, and Guyana. The UN and International Crisis Group have documented that these organizations exploit workers, engage in systematic corruption, and pay military commanders bribes ranging from thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars monthly in exchange for protection. The sector lacks transparent investment frameworks, with Venezuela's state-owned enterprises (Minerven and CAMIMPEG) sourcing minerals from illicit operations and officially exporting them through Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to obscure origin.

What the Trump administration has decreed to be “reimbursement for damages” makes these two assets (particularly valuable and quickly exploitable minerals such as gold and coltan) extremely susceptible to formalization and Western intervention. Mining giants like Barrick Gold (which has recently rebranded as Barrick Mining, owning the world’s largest gold complex), MP Materials (the United States’ rare earths leader) and Lynas Rare Earths have all pointed to potential opportunities. The geopolitical calculus is clear: China now controls 60 to 95 percent of global processing for most of the world’s key minerals and 91 percent of rare-earth refining capacity. Bolstering Venezuelan supply chains shifts coltan, gold and iron ore flows off Chinese dominance but also gives the U.S. alternatives for battery metals and permanent magnet materials vital for defense systems, electric cars and renewable energy infrastructure.

‍How Speyside Can Help

Speyside Group brings deep institutional knowledge of Venezuela’s political, energy, and mining landscapes, having operated in the country for years until recently. Our experience includes work for clients such as Amadeus, Mars, Bridgestone, and Emerging Sovereign Group, among others. For companies assessing exposure to Venezuela—through scenario planning, sanctions compliance advisory, commercial due diligence, or stakeholder mapping—our team is well-positioned to support informed strategic decision-making as the country navigates this U.S.-led transition. 

Following the January 2026 U.S. military operation, successful entry, or re-entry, is not just about capital, it is about information asymmetry and regulatory foresight. Speyside supports energy and mining companies in three specific areas:

1. Market Intelligence & Scenario Planning: We track the indicators that will signal whether the current transition succeeds or falters, from changes in PDVSA’s operational leadership to shifts in Chinese debt restructuring. We provide clients with granular, localized intelligence on how political scenarios (continuity vs. transition) will impact specific concessions, asset integrity, and competitive dynamics.

2. Stakeholder & License to Operate Analysis: Whether operating under the interim Rodríguez administration or preparing for the government that emerges from the constitutional process, understanding the stakeholder map is critical. We help clients identify and assess the key influencers (community leaders, local authorities, industry associations, and labor unions) whose alignment will be necessary to secure and maintain a social license to operate. For mining specifically, we analyze the complex security environment to help companies understand operational risks beyond legal concessions.

3. Regulatory & Sanctions Navigation: We collaborate with legal advisors to help companies interpret the commercial implications of OFAC regulations, secondary sanctions risks, the evolving Venezuelan legal frameworks (like the Anti-Blockage Law), and the shifting landscapes as they develop. We assist with charting compliant entry strategies that strike a balance between first-mover advantage and rigorous risk management.

The Bottom Line: Following Maduro's capture on January 3, 2026, the window for strategic positioning has opened and is measured in months, not years. Speyside Group has guided multinational energy and mining companies through political transitions and regulatory upheavals across Latin America. Companies investing in understanding the landscape today, capitalizing on established regional expertise, will be the ones to move when the opportunity fully materializes.

Contacts

Fiona McCollum, Global Chief Client Officer
m: +44 (0) 778 068 7376  
e: fiona.mccollum@speyside-group.com

Silvia Ardila, Regional Director Latin America
m: +57 3107674429 
e:  Silvia.ardila@speyside-group.com  

www.speyside-group.com

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