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Published
July 31, 2026

Zambia Elections Outlook: A Test for President Hichilema

Speyside Group provides an analytical assessment of the Zambia elections 2026, examining a race that has narrowed significantly since early polling showed President Hakainde Hichilema commanding above 60% support. With the August 13 vote approaching, the emergence of Brian Mundubile and the Tonse-Pamodzi Alliance has transformed what many assumed would be a straightforward incumbency win into a competitive contest, with material implications for investors in Zambia’s mining sector and broader operating environment.

Speyside Group provides an analytical assessment of the Zambia elections 2026, examining a race that has narrowed significantly since early polling showed President Hakainde Hichilema commanding above 60% support. With the August 13 vote approaching, the emergence of Brian Mundubile and the Tonse-Pamodzi Alliance has transformed what many assumed would be a straightforward incumbency win into a competitive contest, with material implications for investors in Zambia’s mining sector and broader operating environment.

KEY TAKEAWAYS FOR INVESTORS

  • The race is closer than it looked six months ago. President Hichilema held polling leads above 60% in early 2026. More recent indicators suggest the opposition, united around Brian Mundubile and the Tonse-Pamodzi Alliance, may have closed much of that gap. Investors should not plan around a foregone conclusion.
  • A runoff scenario materially increases opposition upside. The Zambian electoral system requires a presidential candidate to secure an outright majority. If no candidate clears that threshold, only the top two advance to a runoff, creating conditions for opposition alliance-building and voter realignment that could shift the outcome.
  • Parliamentary losses for UPND carry their own investment implications. Even if Hichilema wins the presidency, projected UPND losses in Lusaka and the Copperbelt will reshape local power structures in Zambia’s most economically significant regions. Investors with existing operations should map exposure to changing local political dynamics, particularly in the mining sector.
  • Both candidates face pressure to act on economic impact, not just growth. Hichilema runs on macroeconomic stabilization; Mundubile on local beneficiation. Either outcome is likely to produce policy pressure on foreign investors to demonstrate tangible community and economic benefit, particularly in extractives. The key variable is the pace and form of that pressure under each administration.

Zambia’s August 13, 2026 election is no longer a foregone conclusion for President Hakainde Hichilema. After holding polling leads above 60% in early 2026, the president now faces a genuinely competitive race against Brian Mundubile and the Tonse-Pamodzi Alliance, driven by voter dissatisfaction with the gap between macroeconomic progress and household-level impact. The most likely outcome remains an Hichilema victory, but a runoff scenario is plausible, and parliamentary losses for his UPND party in Lusaka and the Copperbelt will reshape local power structures regardless of who wins the presidency.

First-mover engagement with the incoming government will be decisive. In either scenario, investors who move quickly to establish relationships with new political leaders and demonstrate the economic contribution of their operations will be better positioned to protect their license to operate into 2027 and beyond.

Compared to a few months ago, the outcome of Zambia’s elections, set for 13 August offers uncertainty for investors. Looking back to early 2026, President Hichilema boasted a commanding lead in opinion polls, with support above 60%.  Most recent polling shows that, together, opposition candidates command a slight majority.  While local polls can be unreliable, the trends are supported by the mood of the electorate and the perceived momentum of the opposition.  

While the most likely scenario remains that President Hichilema retains office, it will be a close run. His UPND is likely to lose parliamentary seats in key areas, especially Lusaka and the Copperbelt (with significant implications for investors through adjustment of local power structures).  There also remains a plausible course for an opposition candidate to win the presidency, if a run-off takes place (only the top 2 will be in it, thus allowing for new alliances and realignment) and voters coalesce around an opposition figure.  

Political and economic conditions have combined to create this unexpectedly close race.  Latent, but powerful, dissatisfaction among the electorate that the government has not delivered on their electoral pledges has created the tinder for voters to increasingly support opposition candidates as a protest against the government. The rise of Brian Mundubile and the Tonse Alliance has, somewhat unexpectedly, provided such an individual.  In the last year, the ruling UPND had effectively used the levers of state to give themselves the best electoral chances, passing a constitutional amendment to change the composition of Parliament in their favor, and limiting the activities of established opposition leaders through, among other things, cyber and public gathering laws. Mundubile essentially made it to the final stage of the election under the radar, avoiding potential efforts to stymie his campaign.  Taking a broader view of electoral dynamics, it is worth noting a somewhat similar, though less extreme, situation in the 2024 Senegalese elections.  

The election contest has boiled down to two competing issues.  On one hand, President Hichilema builds his re-election case on Zambia’s economic progress in recent years — growth, investment, a strengthening kwacha, and the stabilization of the country’s finances.  On the other hand, Brian Mundubile, argues that positive macroeconomic indicators are no success if they do not translate to improved livelihoods for the vast majority of the population.  While a number of individual policy arguments fall under this umbrella, including education and minerals policy, the crux of the debate is economic growth versus economic impact.  

Outlook for Investors:

For international investors and operators in Zambia, the outcome will dictate whether there is a continuation of the president’s investor-friendly approach — essentially, more of the same or a shift toward a greater focus on local beneficiation from international investments under the opposition.  Both sides have leaned toward increasingly populist claims in recent weeks.  For example, the president has promised to allocate mining dumpsites to local ‘artisanal miners’. While, in either outcome, the next government will likely draw back most of their more populist promises, following the historic cycle of Zambian elections, both will feel pressure to meet some of the most pressing concerns of the electorate.  

In practical terms, this means that timing and preparedness to engage with the next government are among the most critical factors in safeguarding license to operate, especially in the mining sector. Moving rapidly to establish relationships with new political leaders and influencers and to make a compelling case for the positive economic impact of investment will heavily influence positions in the country going into 2027. In addition, it will be increasingly important to stay attuned to priorities and frustrations of local communities, both due to how they can influence new power structures, and given how economic dissatisfaction has played such an influential role in the election.  

FAQ

When is Zambia’s election and who are the main candidates?

Zambia’s general election is scheduled for August 13, 2026. The two front-runners are incumbent President Hakainde Hichilema of the UPND, running on a record of macroeconomic stabilization and investor-friendly reform, and Brian Mundubile, presidential candidate of the Tonse-Pamodzi Alliance, who has built his campaign around the argument that growth has not translated into improved living standards for most Zambians.

How did the race become so competitive?

Hichilema held polling leads above 60% in early 2026, but a combination of voter dissatisfaction with the government’s delivery on electoral pledges, the unexpected political rise of Brian Mundubile, and grassroots frustration around cost of living and economic impact has eroded that lead. The UPND’s use of constitutional amendments and cyber laws to manage the political environment has also drawn criticism that contributed to opposition momentum.

What is a runoff and how could it change the outcome?

Zambia’s presidential election requires an outright majority. If no candidate achieves this threshold, only the top two candidates advance to a second round. A runoff would allow other opposition candidates and their supporters to consolidate behind Mundubile, significantly improving his chances, particularly if voter dissatisfaction with the government remains the dominant electoral dynamic.

What are the implications for the mining sector specifically?

Mining is the most exposed sector regardless of outcome. Hichilema’s administration has pursued an investor-friendly approach, though it has also made populist campaign promises, including allocating mining dumpsites to artisanal miners. Mundubile’s platform emphasizes local beneficiation, which would likely mean increased pressure on foreign operators to demonstrate tangible local economic benefit. In either case, first-mover engagement with the incoming administration will be critical to protecting market access and operating conditions.

How significant are the parliamentary elections?

Very significant. UPND is expected to lose parliamentary seats in Lusaka and the Copperbelt, Zambia’s commercial and mining heartlands. This will shift local political dynamics, influence regulatory and enforcement priorities at the constituency level, and potentially affect the governing coalition’s ability to advance legislation without cross-party support. Investors with operations in these regions should monitor the local parliamentary results as closely as the presidential outcome.

How can Speyside help companies prepare for the Zambia election?

Speyside Group supports investors and operators in Zambia by providing pre-election political risk analysis, mapping stakeholder landscapes across the UPND and opposition networks, and designing engagement strategies calibrated to either electoral outcome. Speyside’s on-the-ground expertise across sub-Saharan Africa enables clients to move quickly after polling day, establishing credibility with incoming decision-makers and protecting their license to operate ahead of 2027 policy reviews.

Conclusion

The Zambia election on August 13, 2026 will be a referendum not only on Hichilema’s presidency but on whether economic growth, divorced from visible household-level impact, can sustain a political mandate in an emerging market context. The outcome remains more open than most analysts expected six months ago. What is certain, however, is that the election, whichever way it goes, will reset the terms of engagement between the Zambian state and international investors, particularly in extractives. Organizations that begin stakeholder mapping and relationship-building now, rather than after the results are announced, will be materially better positioned to navigate the policy environment of 2027 and beyond. For Speyside, this election reinforces a broader principle across its emerging-market practice: political transition risk is best managed before a result is announced, not after.

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