The no-confidence vote against the Thai Prime Minister, Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, and 10 other ministers ended as many analysts expected, with all 11 surviving the vote. They will now continue to serve until the end of the House of Representatives’ term on March 23, 2023, or until the Prime Minister dissolves the House for a general election (which many predict will take place after the APEC summit in November).
The Prime Minister received 256 votes of confidence, 206 votes against, and nine abstentions, while Deputy Prime Minister Gen Prawit Wongsuwan received 268 votes of confidence, with only 193 votes against, and 11 abstentions. Interior Minister Gen Anupong Phaochinda received 245 votes of confidence, 212 votes against, and 13 abstentions.
However, unlike the previous censure motion, surviving the no-confidence vote cannot be called a triumph of the government. There are three political concerns worth paying close attention to, all of which have the potential to undermine the government’s stability ahead of the general elections which will need to take place by April next year.
Conflict among the ‘three brothers’
The current Thai constitution was drafted following the 2014 coup d’état by the military junta, led by 3 former Army chiefs. Coming into force in 2017, the constitution consolidated power for the ‘three brothers’: Generals Prayut, Prawit and Anupong, and supported their succession. The Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) was established with Gen Prawit at the head of the party and the Deputy Prime Minister, Gen Anupong oversaw the sizeable civil service as Minister of Interior, and Gen Prayut took office as Prime Minister and ran the government. Since then, the PPRP has evolved into a coalition of influential politicians and served as the vehicle for Prayut’s re-election in 2019.
However, cracks in the trio’s unity began to show in late 2021 when General Prayut sacked Thammanat Promphao, Deputy Agriculture and Cooperatives Minister following speculation that he would vote against the Prime Minister in a planned no confidence vote. This resulted in the formation of the Settakij Thai Party (Thai Economy Party), led by Thammanat and a faction of former PPRP MPs. More importantly, Thammanat was one of Prawit’s closest allies and most trusted aide and will have damaged relationships between the two generals.
Although Gen Prawit claims to have a strong relationship with the Prime Minister and Interior Minister Gen Anupong, in reality there is a widely unspoken but acknowledged fracture between himself, Prayut and Anupong. Settakij Thai Party continue to try to undermine Generals Prayut and Anupong’s authority, including this most recent vote of no confidence, for which most of the party’s MPs voted against them while backing Gen Prawit. They were joined in voting against Prayut and Anupong by six PRPP MPs with strong ties to Gen Prawit, further fueling suspicions of a schism between the three brothers. As the year continues, expect more attention to be focused on these central political players at the center of government, particularly as the general elections come closer.
Wider conflict in ruling coalition
The no-confidence vote also revealed wider fractures among the coalition parties that could jeopardize the PPRP-led coalition’s stability in the upcoming elections.
Minister of Commerce, Jurin Laksanawisit, who is also the Coalition-Democrat Party Leader, surprisingly garnered the fewest confidence votes at only 241 because another key coalition party, the Chart Thai Pattana Party, did not vote for him. In response, the Democrat Party publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome of the vote and commented on continuing issues with Gen Prawit, the head of the ruling PPRP and de facto head of the coalition. The Democrats will call on the coalition to take responsibility for breaking ranks by not voting in support of Jurin and threatening to resign from the coalition if not.
While this may not jeopardize the government’s stability in the short term, make forming a successful coalition in the upcoming election could be challenging without their support. On the other hand, Anutin Charnveerakul, leader of the second largest government coalition partner, affirmed that the Bhumjaithai party stands ready to support the PM and are committed to keeping the coalition strong and would work to prevent early house disillusionment. We can expect that these parties will continue to jockey for the position in the coming months.
Decision of the Constitutional Court on General Prayut’s tenure as Prime Minster
Finally, another key issue to keep an eye on will be the constitutional court’s upcoming ruling on Gen Prayut’s term as Prime Minister. The constitution states that the Prime Minister “shall not hold office for more than eight years in total, whether consecutively or not…” Legal arguments is likely to focus on whether this timing begins in 2014 when Gen Prayut took post after the coup d’état or when he was nominated by the ruling PPRP to continue as a Prime Minster after the 2019 general election.
If the Constitutional Court finds that Gen. Prayut has been Prime Minister since 2014, his official tenure will end on August 23, 2022 and Gen. Prayut could be ordered to suspend his duties, at which point Gen. Prawit, as first deputy prime minister, would take over as prime minister. Given the tensions between the three generals, it is unclear what would happen or whether the ruling coalition could survive this.
The Road Ahead
When all three issues are considered in conjunction with external factors such as criticism of the government’s handling of inflation, the energy and cost of living crises, and how the government has dealt with protestors, it is evident that the next few months will be important in Thai politics.
If popularity alone was the deciding factor, the writing would be on the wall for the deeply unpopular Prayut and the PPRP. In the most recent by-elections, including the recent Pheu Thai Party (PTP) victory in the Bangkok gubernatorial election, PPRP and coalition parties have lost an increasing share of the votes to the opposition.
However, this does not mean we should conclude that tensions within the current administration will weaken the military’s role in Thai politics. Many political analysts predicted that Thammanat’s split following last year’s no-confidence vote would spell the end of General Prayut’s government, but he continues to hold many political cards—a constitution engineered to continue with the status quo through a handpicked senate, compliant election commissioners and a judiciary that generally supports the government. However, the stability of the government is likely to continue to be driven by key players, even if the makeup of the coalition continues to shift. Falling popularity will continue to be a factor, but Thailand’s future will likely continue to be driven by the relationships at the center of government.
Conclusion
While Prayut remains in power for now, mounting political tension, legal uncertainty, and public dissatisfaction suggest a turbulent path ahead. The military’s influence is unlikely to disappear, but internal rivalries and shifting alliances will shape Thailand’s political future.
